Is it, or is it just "like"?
For a long time I have held that a major problem with the discussion of consciousness has revolved around the difference between “is” and “like.” I asked Claude 3.5 Sonnet to expound on this and I got:
The Distinction Between "Like" and "Is" in Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"
Thomas Nagel's seminal 1974 paper "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" raises profound questions about consciousness, subjectivity, and the limits of human understanding. Central to Nagel's argument is the distinction between asking "What is it like to be a bat?" and "What is it to be a bat?" This essay will explore the philosophical implications of this distinction, focusing on how the use of "like" invokes analogy and the limitations of human comprehension, while "is" points to the essence or nature of experience itself.
## The Role of Analogy in Understanding Consciousness
Analogy plays a crucial role in human cognition and our attempts to understand unfamiliar concepts or experiences. As Bartha notes, "Analogical reasoning is fundamental to human thought and, arguably, to some nonhuman animals as well". In the context of Nagel's bat question, the use of "like" explicitly invites an analogical approach to understanding bat consciousness.
When we ask "What is it like to be a bat?", we are implicitly acknowledging that we cannot directly access the bat's subjective experience. Instead, we are seeking some form of comparison or correspondence between our own experiences and those of the bat. This aligns with the definition of analogy as "a comparison between two objects, or systems of objects, that highlights respects in which they are thought to be similar."
However, Nagel argues that this analogical approach is fundamentally limited when it comes to understanding the subjective experience of a radically different organism:
"Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited. It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's feet in an attic."
This passage highlights the inadequacy of trying to understand bat consciousness through mere analogies to human experience. While we can imagine some superficial aspects of bat behavior, Nagel contends that this tells us "only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves," not what it is actually like for the bat itself.
## The Limits of "Like" and Human Imagination
The use of "like" in Nagel's question points to a fundamental epistemological problem: the limits of human imagination and our ability to truly comprehend radically different forms of consciousness. As Nagel argues, "I cannot perform it either by imagining additions to my present experience, or by imagining segments gradually subtracted from it, or by imagining some combination of additions, subtractions, and modifications."
This limitation stems from the fact that our imagination is constrained by our own subjective experiences and cognitive structures. We cannot truly imagine what it is "like" to be a bat because we lack the necessary frame of reference. Our attempts at analogy will always fall short of capturing the bat's actual subjective experience.
## The Essence of "Is" and the Nature of Consciousness
In contrast to the analogical approach implied by "like," asking "What is it to be a bat?" points to a more fundamental inquiry into the nature or essence of bat consciousness. This phrasing suggests a desire to understand the intrinsic qualities of bat experience, rather than seeking comparisons to human experience.
The distinction between "like" and "is" in this context reflects a broader philosophical debate about the nature of consciousness and whether it can be fully captured by third-person, objective descriptions. Nagel argues that consciousness has an irreducibly subjective character:
"[A]n organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism".
This formulation, known as the "what it's like" locution, has become a standard way of characterizing consciousness in philosophy of mind. It emphasizes that there is an inherent, subjective quality to conscious experience that cannot be fully captured by external observation or description.
## The Limits of Objectivity and Reductionism
Nagel's distinction between "like" and "is" also speaks to broader issues in the philosophy of mind, particularly the limits of objectivity and reductionist approaches to understanding consciousness. The difficulty in answering "What is it to be a bat?" highlights what Nagel sees as a fundamental challenge to materialist theories of mind.
Traditional scientific approaches aim for objective, third-person descriptions of phenomena. However, Nagel argues that consciousness possesses irreducibly subjective features that resist such objective characterization. This poses a challenge to reductionist accounts that seek to explain consciousness solely in terms of physical processes or functional organization.
As Nagel puts it, "If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could be done". This suggests that the question "What is it to be a bat?" may be fundamentally unanswerable from our human perspective, as it requires access to a form of subjectivity that is alien to us.
## Implications for Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science
The distinction between "like" and "is" in Nagel's bat question has significant implications for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. It challenges researchers to grapple with the limits of third-person methodologies in studying consciousness and raises questions about the possibility of a complete scientific account of subjective experience.
Some philosophers and scientists have attempted to address this challenge by developing new approaches to studying consciousness. For example, Daniel Dennett has argued that many "interesting or theoretically important" features of bat consciousness could potentially be accessible through careful scientific investigation. However, critics contend that such approaches still fail to capture the intrinsic, subjective quality of what it "is" to be a bat.
## The Role of Imagination and Empathy
While Nagel emphasizes the limitations of imagination in understanding bat consciousness, the use of "like" in his question does point to the important role that imagination and empathy play in our attempts to understand other minds. Even if we cannot fully grasp what it is to be a bat, the effort to imagine or analogize to their experience can still be valuable in expanding our understanding and empathy.
This relates to broader discussions in philosophy and cognitive science about the nature of empathy and our ability to understand other minds. While perfect understanding may be impossible, the process of trying to imagine what it is "like" to be another creature can still yield insights and foster a greater appreciation for the diversity of conscious experience.
## Conclusion
The distinction between asking "What is it like to be a bat?" and "What is it to be a bat?" in Nagel's paper highlights fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind and our understanding of consciousness. The use of "like" points to the role of analogy and the limitations of human imagination in comprehending radically different forms of experience. In contrast, "is" speaks to the intrinsic nature of subjective experience and the challenges it poses to objective, scientific inquiry.
Ultimately, Nagel's question and the distinction between "like" and "is" serve as a powerful reminder of the mysteries that still surround consciousness and the subjective nature of experience. It challenges us to recognize the limits of our understanding while continuing to explore the rich diversity of conscious experience in the world around us.
Here is a list of academic references for the essay on the distinction between "like" and "is" in relation to Thomas Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?":
1. Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435-450.
2. Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown and Company.
3. Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
4. Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18(2), 227-247.
5. Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127-136.
6. Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64(4), 354-361.
7. Searle, J. R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press.
8. Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.
9. Bayne, T., & Montague, M. (Eds.). (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press.
10. Carruthers, P., & Veillet, B. (2011). The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology (pp. 35-56). Oxford University Press.
11. Bartha, P. (2019). Analogy and Analogical Reasoning. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition).
12. Van Dooren, T., & Rose, D. B. (2012). Storied-places in a multispecies city. Humanimalia, 3(2), 1-27.
13. Koch, C. (2012). Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist. MIT Press.